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Abstract
This paper empirically examines which type of fiscal levies are environmental taxes, 
by analyzing how governments actually use them. The theoretical literature is polar-
ized between two alternative interpretations of environmental taxes: the Pigouvian 
and the Leviathan hypotheses, each leading to alternative testable hypotheses. We 
test them on a sample where the analysts’ discretionary evaluations are minimal, the 
EU-28 countries that committed themselves to correcting a negative environmental 
externality, the greenhouse gas emissions, by 2020. The estimates lend support to 
the strict Pigouvian hypothesis, while the Leviathan hypothesis appears less consist-
ent with the data.
Keywords Environmental taxes · Pigouvian taxation · Leviathan government · GHG 
reduction · Arellano–Bond GMM
JEL Classification Q28 · H54 · H87 · D72 · D73 · D78
1 Introduction
What type of taxes are, in fact, environmental taxes (henceafter, ET)? For what pur-
poses governments actually use them, and how efficient are they in achieving such 
goals?
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The theoretical literature is polarized between two alternative answers to these 
questions, which can rationalize why governments resort to ET. The classical Pigou-
vian interpretation holds that ET suffice to internalize and correct negative environ-
mental externalities, regardless of how their revenues are being spent (Baumol and 
Oates 1988). The alternative interpretation views ET just like any other tax, with the 
notable exception that they are the least unpopular among all fiscal levies, because 
of the citizens’ favorable outlook on the protection of the environment (EU Com-
mission 2014). Leviathan governments, aiming at maximizing tax revenues at the 
lowest political cost, exploit this feature and resort to ET relatively more, irrespec-
tive of their efficiency at achieving environmental goals (Kirchgassner and Schnei-
der 2003). These hypotheses reflect two opposite visions of government: a benevo-
lent one, stemming from the welfare economics tradition, and a utility-maximizing 
one, associated with the public choice school.
This paper empirically analyzes how governments actually use ET to verify 
which of these two alternative theoretical interpretations best represents the real-
ity of environmental fiscal policy. To this end we consider the sample of the 28 EU 
countries over the period 2005-2017 that, within the Lisbon agenda, in 2009 have 
formally decided to commit themselves to attain a specific environmental protection 
target: the reduction of Green House Gases (henceafter, GHG). Empirically, we use 
data on Greenhouse gas emissions in Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) sectors con-
cerned by the target1.
Two features make this sample especially suitable for this type of analysis: first, 
GHG reduction is a clearly measurable objective;2 second, the countries in the sam-
ple have chosen their reduction target themselves.3 Both features reduce to a strict 
minimum the analysts’ discretion in the evaluation of the governments’ use of ET.4 
Such an attribute is quite hard to find in the rest of the literature and it greatly eases 
the task of identifying which theory best represents the way governments actually 
use ET.
The focus on GHG as pollutant calls into question the role of the heterogenous 
firms, both in terms of technology adopted and of size of production, which are 
one of the major (albeit not the only) sources of this type of emissions. As our 
1 Data are available since 2005.
2 Article 2.1 of decision 406/2009 defines the GHG emissions as “…the emission of carbon dioxide 
 (CO2), methane  (CH4), nitrous oxide  (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and 
sulphur hexafluoride  (SF6), […] expressed in terms of tons of carbon dioxide equivalent”.
3 Specifically, the EU member states’ targets are given by the EU Effort Sharing Decision where “Mem-
ber States’ reduction efforts should be based on the principle of solidarity between Member States […] 
taking into account the relative per capita GDP of Member States”. Furthermore, the national 2020 tar-
gets apply to non-Exchange Trade System emissions, a crucial fact, since it allows analyzing the impact 
of ET in reducing a type of emissions and in sectors where an important policy instrument, such as ETS, 
do not operate (preliminary n. 6 of decision 406/2009).
4 Decision 406/2009 of the EU Parliament and Council of the EU commits the EU member countries 
collectively to reduce GHG to 70% of their 1990 levels by the year 2020. In addition to this EU wide tar-
get, the Decision sets also country-specific targets, to account for the economic and environmental start-
ing point situations of each country, especially those of the former Eastern European nations (Annexe II 
to Decision 4006/2009).
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analysis is conducted at the country level, we refer to the average environmental 
friendliness of the technology adopted by the industrial sector of the country.
Our empirical strategy consists in successively testing the empirical restric-
tions that theory associates with the two alternative interpretations of ET. To ver-
ify the Pigouvian hypothesis we compare the intensity with which each country 
has resorted to ET with the degree of success in achieving the GHG reduction tar-
get; a positive correlation between the country’s distance from the target and its 
resort to ET confirms the hypothesis that ET are adopted to (and effective at) cor-
recting the negative environmental externality. Conversely, the Leviathan hypoth-
esis, which basically states that governments set taxes just so to maximize rev-
enues, disregarding the environmental goals of ET, is verified if ET revenues are 
positively correlated with redistributive, vote buying expenditures items, rather 
than with public good type of programs.
This type of analysis faces two fundamental difficulties, which the literature 
has failed to address so far. The first is that the distance from the environmental 
target can be either negative or positive. As Fig. 1 shows, countries can either 
fall short of their target, and be therefore supposed to intensify their environ-
mental policies; or they can go beyond their target and might then in principle 
relax their fiscal efforts aimed at reducing GHG emissions. The negative and 
positive values that the target variable may assume of course affect the inter-
pretation of the estimated coefficients and complicate the analysis. We address 
this problem by distinguishing between countries with a positive difference with 
respect to the target, i.e., those that have already achieved it or even done better, 
AUT: Austria, BEL: Belgium, BGR: Bulgaria, CYP: Cyprus, CZE: Czech Republic, DNK : Denmark, EST : Estonia, FIN : Finland, FRA: 
France, DEU: Germany, GRC: Greece, HUN: Hungary, IRL: Ireland, ITA: Italy, LVA: Latvia, LTU : Lithuania, LUX: Luxembourg, 
MLT :Malta, NLD : Netherlands, POL : Poland, PRT :Portugal, ROU: Romania, SVK: Slovakia, SVN: Slovenia, ESP: Spain, SWE: Sweden, 
GBR: United Kingdom 
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Fig. 1  Relative distance from country specific targets for GHG emissions set by Decision n. 406/2009 
mean over the period 2005–2017)
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from those with a negative difference, i.e., those which have still to attain their 
target. These two sets of countries are illustrated in Fig. 1.
The second problem is the choice of the proper fiscal indicator to measure the 
effect of ET on the GHG target. The theoretical literature is not univocal in this 
respect. Pigouvian models (Baumol and Oates 1988; Sandmo 2010) advise using 
the effective marginal ET rate as the policy choice variable, as a measure of the 
disincentive effect to polluting that taxation engenders. Revenue-based measures 
of fiscal effort, such as the ratio of ET revenues over total tax revenues, seem 
instead more appropriate for the Leviathan hypothesis, as they reveal the degree 
to which the government acts in a revenue maximizing way in environmental pol-
icy (Schöb 2003). In addition, the ET’s efficiency at correcting the externality—
a point to be verified in the analysis—also affects the choice of either the rate-
based or the revenue-based indicator of the government’s effort at reducing the 
externality. If governments actually use ET in a Pigouvian way and these taxes 
are effective at reducing GHG emissions, we should observe in those countries 
higher than average ET rates but lower than average ET revenues, since the high 
tax rates reduced the externality and hence the revenue source. Yet, if ETs were 
inefficient at correcting the externality and governments still acted in a Pigouvian 
way, the revenue source would still exist, so that both rates and revenues should 
be higher than average. To sort out this potentially serious problem, we estimate 
the model using proxies for both ET rates and revenues. Indeed, the correlation 
coefficient between the two indicators is r = 0.16 , low enough to legitimize the 
use of both of them as alternatives in our analysis. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the 
average values of these two variables in the countries of our sample.
As the tested hypotheses refer to two alternatives views of government, we 
examine the politico-institutional transmission mechanisms between the resort 
to environmental fiscal means and the attainment of environmental goals—an 
issue understudied so far (Kirchgassner and Schneider 2003; Cadoret and Pado-
vano 2016). In a Pigouvian world the efficiency of government is the only con-
ditioning factor to the attainment of the policy goal; in a Leviathan world, meas-
ures of the rule of law limit the discretionary action of the government, which 
should instead be sensitive to the demands of special interest groups. We there-
fore introduce in our empirical specification proxies for the stringency of envi-
ronmental regulations and for lobbying activity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the empiri-
cal strategy, the dataset and the specification of the model. The results of the 
estimates are presented and discussed in Sect. 3. Section 4 summarizes the con-
clusions of the analysis.
2  Empirics
2.1  Empirical strategy
Bringing the two theoretical hypotheses to the data first implies the choice of the 
dependent variables. These in turn will be regressed, as discussed in Sect. 2.2, on 
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the main variables of interest related to each hypothesis plus three sets of controls: 
(1) the economic variables X; (2) the energy characteristics and environmental pol-
icy variables W; (3) the politico-institutional variables Z.
To test the Pigouvian interpretation we select relative the difference between the 
country’s GHG emissions target and the observed emissions, named GHG_DIFF, as 
the endogenous variable (see “Appendix”). It measures the relative distance separat-
ing the country from the target assigned by Decision 406/2009—Annexe II. When 
necessary, this variable is separated in two groups, one including the countries that 
are doing better than their target (usually, the Eastern European ones) and have thus 
a positive difference; the other with the countries that are underscoring their specific 
target (mainly the Western Europeans) and show a negative difference. The specifi-
cation of the empirical model is as follows:
where i identifies the country and t the year and  are the country fixed effects. Since 
the attainment of the GHG target is progressive over time, the equation includes the 
lagged dependent variable; it is estimated dynamically via Arellano–Bond GMM 
estimator with robust standard errors, taking into account the potential endogeneity 
problem with ET. This may arise because proximity to the GHG target may condi-
tion countries’ resort to ET, but at the same time the use of ET (if effective) may 
affect the countries’ distance from the target.
(1)
GHG_DIFF
it
= 1GHG_DIFFit−1 + 1R_t + 1T_t
+ 1it + 1it + 1it + i + it
AUT: Austria, BEL: Belgium, BGR: Bulgaria, CYP: Cyprus, CZE: Czech Republic, DNK : Denmark, EST : Estonia, FIN : Finland, FRA: 
France, DEU: Germany, GRC: Greece, HUN: Hungary, IRL: Ireland, ITA: Italy, LVA: Latvia, LTU : Lithuania, LUX: Luxembourg, 
MLT :Malta, NLD : Netherlands, POL : Poland, PRT :Portugal, ROU: Romania, SVK: Slovakia, SVN: Slovenia, ESP: Spain, SWE: Sweden, 
GBR: United Kingdom 
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Fig. 2  Total environmental taxes as a percentage of total revenues from taxes and social contributions 
(mean over the period 2005–2017)
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Among the explanatory variables, the Pigouvian hypothesis calls for examining 
two complementary measures of ET. The first one represents the revenue of envi-
ronmental taxes (labeled ET_REV). It is measured with the ratio of all the envi-
ronmental tax revenues over total tax revenues.5 The second one is a proxy for the 
effective marginal tax rate of environmental taxation (labeled ET_RATE). As such 
we use the variation of the implicit energy tax rate calculated over two successive 
calendar years.6 As mentioned in the introduction, if ET_RATE is used in the Pig-
ouvian way and proves effective at reducing GHG emissions, we should observe a 
negative correlation between ET_RATE and GHG emissions, which should reduce 
the tax base for the ETs. If instead ET are inefficient at correcting the externality, 
even in the case when governments acted in a Pigouvian way, the externality would 
still remain and the revenue source with it. In this case we should observe both high 
ET rates and revenues. We hence estimate the model using both ET_RATE and 
ET_REV as proxies for the country’s environmental fiscal effort. We hold that the 
AUT: Austria, BEL: Belgium, BGR: Bulgaria, CYP: Cyprus, CZE: Czech Republic, DNK : Denmark, EST : Estonia, FIN : Finland, FRA: 
France, DEU: Germany, GRC: Greece, HUN: Hungary, IRL: Ireland, ITA: Italy, LVA: Latvia, LTU : Lithuania, LUX: Luxembourg, 
MLT :Malta, NLD : Netherlands, POL : Poland, PRT :Portugal, ROU: Romania, SVK: Slovakia, SVN: Slovenia, ESP: Spain, SWE: Sweden, 
GBR: United Kingdom 
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Fig. 3  Effective marginal tax rate of environmental taxation (mean over the period 2005–2017)
5 According to Eurostat, our data source, “… an environmental tax is a tax whose base is a physical unit 
(or a proxy of a physical unit) of something that has a proven, specific negative impact on the environ-
ment”. Hence environmental taxes fall within the following economic sectors: energy, transport, pollu-
tion, resources. Eurostat data are compatible with the concepts used in the system of national accounts. 
Throughout the paper, we stick to this definition and to this source of official data.
6 The implicit energy tax rate is measured as the ratio of energy tax revenues to final energy consump-
tion. Energy tax revenues are calculated in constant price euros (deflated with the implicit GDP deflator, 
prices of year 2010) and final energy consumption is assessed in tons of oil equivalent. Eurostat is the 
source for these data.
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Pigouvian hypothesis is confirmed if: a) in countries with a positive relative differ-
ence between the GHG target and the observed emissions, there is a positive cor-
relation between GHG_DIFF and ET_RATE; that because higher tax rates further 
reduce the emissions and thus increase the positive difference between the target 
and the observed value of GHG; furthermore GHG_DIFF and ET_REV should be 
not significantly correlated; b) in countries where instead there is a negative differ-
ence between the GHG target and the observed emissions, again a positive correla-
tion is found between GHG_DIFF and ET_RATE, because higher tax rates reduce 
the emissions and therefore reduce the negative difference between the target and 
the observed value of GHG; once more a not significant correlation should exist 
between GHG_DIFF and ET_REV.
Among the economic variables of vector X we begin by examining the com-
plex relationship between income-related variables and pollution. A first theoreti-
cal linkage is the well-known “environmental Kutznets curve”; this hypothesis 
posits a positive relationship between economic development and environmental 
degradation at low levels of per capita income, which then turns negative when 
citizens-taxpayers’ support for environmental protection begins to improve envi-
ronmental quality, including the reduction of GHG emissions. In the context of 
our sample of highly developed countries, most observations should be paced in 
the negatively sloped portion of the curve. More recently, however, Ordás Criado 
et al. (2011) provide a partially observational equivalent explanation of the rela-
tionship between income and environmental protection. In the context of neoclas-
sical growth models, they show that, along the pollution optimal path, the growth 
rate of output per capita has a negative impact on the growth rate of emissions 
per capita (scale effect), which is in turn negatively related with the initial level 
of pollution (defensive effect). In the extended version of their model, the impact 
of the initial level of output per capita is not a priori defined. Their contribu-
tion requires considering not only a measure of per capita income growth (which 
would be sufficient to test the environmental Kutznets curve hypothesis) but also 
the initial level of per capita income as a control. We then insert in Eq. (1) both 
indicators of per capita economic growth (G_GDPPC) and of per capita income 
levels (GDPPC) in logarithm, and let the sign be determined by the empirical 
analysis.
Vector W includes controls for energy and environmental policies. We control for 
the energy intensity in production (variable ENERGY_INT), specified as the kilo-
gram of oil equivalent per 1000 euros worth of products. The expected sign on this 
covariate is always negative, since in countries with a positive difference higher val-
ues of ENERGY_INT increase GHG emissions, thus reducing the value of GHG_
DIFF; in countries with a negative difference, instead, more pollution increases the 
negative GHG_DIFF, resulting again in an inverse correlation. We also include a 
linear TREND, which captures the increasing diffusion of environmental regulations 
over time in our sample (Botta and Kozluk 2014).
Variables in vector Z characterize the transmission mechanism of the envi-
ronmental taxation. To capture the opposite visions of government that the wel-
fare economics and the public choice traditions propose, we include two control 
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variables. The first is RLE, an indicator of the degree of enforcement of the law in 
the country, from the World Bank World Governance Indicators. Greater values of 
RLE suggest that government decisions are more efficiently implemented, which 
minimizes government discretion that would instead be magnified in a Leviathan 
world7. Conversely, a Leviathan-type government should be privy to special inter-
est groups that stand against environmental regulation; we proxy this possible 
effect through the variable VA_INDUS, i.e., the share of value added from indus-
try on total GDP. This variable is commonly used in the literature (Fredriksson 
et al. 2004; Cadoret and Padovano 2018) and reflects the idea that the greater is 
the value added of an industry, the higher are the producers’ costs of coordina-
tion in order to get organized as a lobby. The predicted impact of VA_IND on 
GHG_DIFF is therefore positive, since more value added increases lobbying costs, 
which reduces observed GHG thus increasing the positive difference (or increases 
the negative one).
In a Pigouvian world a statistically not significant coefficient would suggest that 
these pressures have no impact on governments’ tax decisions; a positive and signifi-
cant coefficient, instead, would capture the effect that the size of the industry exerts 
on environmental taxation.
2.2  Sample
The sample encompasses 28 countries that, through Decision 406/2009, have (a) 
committed themselves to collectively reduce GHG to 70% of their 1990 levels by 
the year 2020; and (b) agreed to a series of country-specific targets, to account 
for the economic and environmental starting points of each country, especially 
the former Eastern European ones (Benjamin et  al. 2015). These countries are 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The time interval covers the 
period 2005–2017, for which Eurostat provides coherent data for the Greenhouse 
gas emissions in Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) sectors; furthermore, 2005 is the 
beginning year for the effort sharing policy in the attainment of the GHG target. 
Each variable thus features a maximum of 13  ×  28  =  364 observations, quite 
enough to obtain efficient estimates. Table  1 provides the descriptive statistics, 
while Table in the “Appendix” reassumes the characteristics of the variables and 
their data sources.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the results that are pertinent to the objective of our anal-
ysis. We test all the control variables described in 2.2 and keep the significant ones.
7 We have also tried alternative variables, such as the World Bank measure of regulatory quality and of 
control of corruption. The results do not change qualitatively at all, since all these indicators are highly 
correlated. We choose the measure of the rule of law because of its broader scope. The estimates with the 
alternative indicators are available upon request.
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3  Pigouvian or Leviathan taxes?
3.1  Testing the Pigouvian hypothesis
The estimates of equation (1) are reported in Table 2, which shows the estimation 
results for the whole sample of 26 countries (model 1–3), for countries with a nega-
tive GHG_DIFF values (model 4, i.e., those that have still to attain the target, mainly 
the western Europeans ones) and for those with a positive value of GHG_DIFF 
(model 5, i.e., the countries that have already attained the target, mainly the western 
Europeans ones).
Our estimates appear consistent with the Pigouvian hypothesis: ET_REV is nega-
tive and not statistically significant, whereas ET_RATE has the expected positive 
sign. This pattern of results confirms that high marginal rates on ET actually reduce 
the environmental externality represented by the GHG emissions and the tax base 
for ET with it. The positive and significant coefficient of ET_RATE in both sub-
samples is consistent with the Pigouvian hypothesis; its impact is quantitatively 
similar in both Eastern European countries, which have already achieved their tar-
gets, and in Western European ones, which still have to attain it. The Arellano–Bond 
estimation technique here accounts for the potential endogeneity of ET_REV; yet, 
since its coefficient is not statistically significant, this does not affect the validity of 
the estimates.
Coming to the economic controls, we observe that faster economic growth 
reduces the distance from the target, consistently with the theory of the environ-
mental Kutznets curve; this effect is especially evident in countries with a positive 
distance from the target, i.e., mainly the Eastern European ones, characterized by 
rates of economic expansion above the sample average. Higher levels of GDP per 
capita instead seem to raise GHG emissions, thereby reducing the distance from 
the target in both the short and in the long run, regardless of the country’s position 
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N mean sd min max
GHG_DIFF 364 0.0694 0.167 − 0.195 0.707
D_ET_RATE 364 3.618 14.79 − 49.79 83.35
ET_REV 364 7.263 1.692 4.150 11.63
G_GDP_PC 364 1.728 3.920 − 14.56 23.94
DEBT 364 60.48 34.70 3.700 178.9
logGDP_PC 364 10.37 0.371 9.427 11.49
logENERGY_INT 364 4.980 0.285 4.039 5.717
ET_RATE 364 41.068 13.174 15 62.28
RLE 364 1.134 0.611 − 0.138 2.100
VA_INDUS 364 23.46 5.868 9.368 38.52
SC_EXP 364 16.40 3.906 7.900 25.60
GS_EXP 364 6.393 1.897 2.800 12.90
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with respect to the target. Among the energy/environmental variables of vector W, 
the estimates confirm the expected negative relationship between energy intensity 
of production and the dependent variable, as well the expected positive relation-
ship between the trend and the dependent variable. Specifically, in countries with 
a positive difference, higher values of ENERGY_INT reflect higher GHG emis-
sions, which reduce the value of GHG_DIFF; in countries with a negative difference 
instead more emissions increase the negative GHG_DIFF, resulting again in a nega-
tive correlation. As it is logic to expect, the negative impact of high energy intensity 
is stronger in countries that still have to attain their target. The trend has a positive 
coefficient throughout the sample, but it is again stronger in countries with a posi-
tive coefficient. To the extent that this variable captures the diffusion of regulation, 
this result suggests that command and control measures are less effective at reducing 
GHG emissions than Pigouvian taxes.
Table 2  Dependent variable GHG_DIFF
Arellano–Bond dynamic panel-data estimation, in (1), (4) and (5) variable ET_REV is assumed to be 
endogeneous, it’s not included in the matrix of instrumental variables, Standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GHG_DIFF GHG_DIFF GHG_DIFF GHG_DIFF 
< 0
GHG_DIFF >0
GHG_DIFFt− 1 0.4556*** 
(0.0974)
0.4118*** 
(0.0245)
0.2927*** 
(0.0246)
− 0.0191 
(0.1299)
0.4957*** 
(0.0703)
D_ET_RATE 0.0004** 
(0.0002)
0.0004*** 
(0.0001)
0.0006*** 
(0.0001)
0.0003*** 
(0.0001)
0.0003*** 
(0.0001)
G_GDP_PC − 0.0023*** 
(0.0005)
− 0.0022*** 
(0.0003)
− 0.0026*** 
(0.0002)
0.0004 
(0.0003)
− 0.0054*** 
(0.0007)
logGDP_PC − 0.4594*** 
(0.0490)
− 0.5396*** 
(0.0326)
− 0.6736*** 
(0.0319)
− 0.7302*** 
(0.0606)
− 0.5238*** 
(0.0743)
logENERGY_
INT
− 0.1592*** 
(0.0350)
− 0.2290*** 
(0.0189)
− 0.2143*** 
(0.0198)
− 0.4088*** 
(0.0416)
− 0.0894** 
(0.0361)
VA_INDUS 0.0125*** 
(0.0013)
0.0059*** 
(0.0014)
0.0093*** 
(0.0018)
RLE 0.0299*** 
(0.0105)
0.0258 
(0.0200)
0.0414*** 
(0.0157)
TREND 0.0028*** 
(0.0010)
0.0016*** 
(0.0006)
0.0073*** 
(0.0008)
0.0010 
(0.0018)
0.0085*** 
(0.0011)
ET_REV − 0.0023 
(0.0085)
− 0.0021 
(0.0083)
− 0.0022  
(0.0084)
Constant 5.5874*** 
(0.6332)
6.7782*** 
(0.4191)
7.7586*** 
(0.3977)
9.5602*** 
(0.7607)
5.5513*** 
(0.9153)
Observations 307 307 307 126 181
Number of id 28 28 28 17 24
AR1 p value 0.0033 0.000 0.0011 0.28 0.002
AR2 p value 0.309 0.241 0.232 0.68 0.06
Sargan p value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Among the variables of the political vector Z, in all the specifications, the coef-
ficient on the industry’s value added is positive and significant. This sign is not con-
sistent with the Leviathan hypothesis, since under this type of governments indus-
trial lobbies should be able to obtain fewer (or less stringent) constraints on their 
polluting activities, resulting in a smaller difference between the targeted and the 
observed values of GHG emissions (Cadoret and Padovano 2018). Conversely, in a 
Pigouvian environment, a positive and significant coefficient on VA_INDUS sug-
gests that polluting industries are taxed more, pollute less, which increases the dis-
tance between the targeted and the observed values of GHG emissions. The posi-
tive coefficients on the proxy for the rule of law too corroborates this interpretation; 
once more, this coefficient is larger in the with a positive difference, i.e., the Western 
European ones.
3.2  Testing the Leviathan hypothesis
There are two possible approaches to test the Leviathan hypothesis. One is a con-
trario; in other words, given the stark differences between the implications of the 
Pigouvian and the Leviathan hypothesis, the empirical support for the former can be 
taken as falsification of the latter. We take an alternative route and try to make a step 
further in the analysis, by proposing a direct test of the Leviathan hypothesis. In this 
respect, our empirical strategy exploits the fact that Leviathan governments maxi-
mize revenues to secure their power base and attempt to do so at the lowest political 
cost. ET lends itself well to these political maneuvers, as ET are known to be the 
least unpopular of all taxes (EU Commission 2014) because of voters’ positive out-
look on protecting the environment. Furthermore, in order to secure a power struc-
ture the Leviathan should channel the ET revenues to redistributive expenditures, 
which can target specific groups, thus yielding higher political returns, as opposed to 
general purpose, public-good like expenditure items, which benefit the population at 
large in a rather undifferentiated manner.
We therefore regress two quite opposite types of expenditure items, social expen-
ditures SC_EXP (as classified by Eurostat) and expenditures for general services 
GS_EXP on ET revenues and the same vector of controls as in Eq. (1). Both are 
normalized by GDP. According to the Eurostat classification itself, social protec-
tion expenditures are the ones with the strongest redistributive profile, while general 
services are the closest to the concept of public goods. The stark difference between 
these expenditure items maximizes the power of our test which, admittedly, because 
of the rather low share of ET over total revenues, remains rather low. Nevertheless, 
to confirm the Leviathan hypothesis, we should find a positive correlation between 
ET_REV and SC_EXP, but not with GS_EXP. A lack of statistical significance on 
the coefficients of ET_REV on both expenditure items is consistent with the impli-
cation of the Pigouvian hypothesis that ET are sufficient to correct the externality, 
and revenues should not be targeted to any specific expenditure. Using once more an 
Arellano–Bond technique, we estimate the following model:
(2)it = 1it−1 + 1_t + 1it + 1it + 1it + i + it
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where vector Yit includes SC_EXP, but not with GS_EXP. Table 3 reports the results 
for general services expenditures, while table  4 illustrates the estimates for social 
protection. None of the estimates, conducted on the whole sample of countries and 
other the subgroups of under- and over-achievers with respect to the GHG target, 
ever reveal a statistically significant coefficient on ET_REV; this result further con-
firms the Pigouvian hypothesis and disproves the Leviathan one.
4  Conclusions
Examining how governments use ET is a difficult task, especially in terms of find-
ing a proper empirical strategy; our one has the important advantage of minimizing 
the discretionary intervention of the analyst in evaluating the countries’ commitment 
in achieving environmental goals, since we focus on a clearly measurable environ-
mental goal, the reduction of GHG emission, which the EU-27 countries them-
selves have formally decided to attain. Hence, and with no claim of having provided 
conclusive and/or general evidence, our interpretation of the overall results of the 
Table 3  Dependent variable General Services Expenditures (GS_EXP)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GS_EXP GS_EXP GS_EXP 
(GHG_DIFF 
< 0)
GS_DEP 
(GHG_DIFF 
< 0)
GS_DEP 
(GHG_
DIFF > 0)
GS_DEP 
(GHG_DIFF 
> 0)
GS_EXPt− 1 0.5947*** 
(0.0350)
0.4784*** 
(0.0368)
0.4829*** 
(0.0651)
0.1851*** 
(0.0680)
0.3911*** 
(0.0545)
0.3405*** 
(0.0444)
ET_REV 0.0063 
(0.0262)
− 0.0028 
(0.0786)
− 0.0362 
(0.0418)
DEBT 0.0306*** 
(0.0023)
0.0285*** 
(0.0072)
0.0295*** 
(0.0049)
OTHER_
REV
0.1113** 
(0.0506)
0.1847 
(0.1938)
− 0.0073 
(0.0975)
G_GDP_PC − 0.0416*** 
(0.0047)
− 0.0417*** 
(0.0033)
− 0.0126* 
(0.0065)
− 0.0088 
(0.0094)
− 0.0421*** 
(0.0039)
− 0.0406*** 
(0.0029)
logGDP_PC − 1.4331** 
(0.5762)
1.6647*** 
(0.4648)
− 4.0198*** 
(0.6408)
− 2.3034 
(1.8663)
− 1.6884** 
(0.7558)
2.9283*** 
(1.1247)
RLE 0.8829** 
(0.3916)
0.8232** 
(0.3481)
0.1937 
(0.2394)
0.1083 
(0.4567)
1.0560 
(0.8051)
0.4939 
(0.5465)
TREND − 0.0182*** 
(0.0066)
− 0.1245*** 
(0.0080)
0.0115 
(0.0092)
− 0.0830*** 
(0.0312)
− 0.0362** 
(0.0169)
− 0.1789*** 
(0.0286)
Constant 16.6080*** 
(6.2076)
− 26.3423*** 
(7.0905)
45.5019*** 
(7.1775)
11.2851 
(20.1028)
20.7684*** 
(7.7455)
− 25.7776** 
(12.9769)
Observations 308 308 126 126 182 182
Number of id 28 28 17 17 24 24
AR1-pval 0.057 0.059 0.081 0.07 0.09 0.10
AR2-pval 0.427 0.461 0.55 0.258 0.39 0.36
sargan-pval 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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analysis is that environmental taxation is mainly conducted in a Pigouvian way and 
that it is efficient at correcting the environmental externality. The test of the theoreti-
cally opposite Leviathan hypothesis instead shows no support from the data.
The positive correlation between ET rates and distance from the target, together 
with the negative statistical significance on environmental tax revenues suggests 
that high Pigouvian tax rates reduce the environmental externality represented by 
GHG emissions and therefore shrink the tax base for these taxes. Both countries that 
have already attained their GHG emissions targets and those that still have to meet it 
are characterized by similar levels of correlation between ET rates and reduction of 
GHG emissions. This suggests that environmental policies tend to become embed-
ded in the fiscal system even after certain policy goals are reached.
Table 4  Dependent variable SC_EXP
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SC_EXP SC_EXP SC_EXP 
(GHG_DIFF 
< 0)
SC_EXP 
(GHG_
DIFF< 0)
SC_EXP 
(GHG_DIFF 
> 0)
SC_EXP 
(GHG_DIFF 
> 0)
SC_EXPt-1 0.5679*** 
(0.0511)
0.6180*** 
(0.0460)
0.6784*** 
(0.0726)
0.6594*** 
(0.0884)
0.5897*** 
(0.0451)
0.5480*** 
(0.0394)
ET_REV 0.0686 
(0.0462)
0.0487 
(0.1563)
− 0.0430 
(0.0546)
DEBT − 0.0034 
(0.0055)
− 0.0119 
(0.0077)
0.0016 
(0.0101)
OTHER_
REV
− 0.0087 
(0.0649)
− 0.1691 
(0.2604)
− 0.0601 
(0.0865)
G_GDP_PC − 0.1630*** 
(0.0099)
− 0.1661*** 
(0.0060)
− 0.1850*** 
(0.0181)
− 0.1719*** 
(0.0158)
− 0.1551*** 
(0.0041)
− 0.1496*** 
(0.0071)
logGDP_PC − 4.9498*** 
(1.7341)
− 3.5733*** 
(0.6515)
− 4.6653* 
(2.7882)
− 8.0887*** 
(2.8227)
− 1.9339*** 
(0.6562)
− 1.8281 
(1.1423)
RLE 0.3937** 
(0.1884)
0.4589 
(0.4430)
0.2370 
(0.3074)
− 0.1799 
(0.7152)
0.6643* 
(0.3732)
0.1877 
(0.5402)
TREND 0.0765*** 
(0.0220)
0.0616*** 
(0.0173)
0.0887** 
(0.0348)
0.1462*** 
(0.0450)
0.0341*** 
(0.0098)
0.0005 
(0.0454)
Constant 57.3412*** 
(18.5761)
43.5777*** 
(5.9375)
54.4994* 
(31.5573)
108.4456*** 
(41.3246)
25.9914*** 
(6.8856)
31.1422** 
(15.0032)
Observa-
tions
308 308 126 126 182 182
Number 
of id
28 28 17 17 24 24
AR1-pval 0.0057 0.001 0.31 0.06 0.00 0.06
AR2-pval 0.015 0.012 0.05 0.02 0.43 0.29
sargan-pval 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Appendix
Name Definition Source
GHG Greenhouse gas emissions in Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) sec-
tors—million tonnes  CO2 equivalent
Eurostat
Target DÉCISION (UE) 2017/1471 de la Commission du 10 août 2017 
modifiant la décision 2013/162/UE afin de réviser les allocations 
annuelles de quotas d’émission des États membres pour la péri-
ode 2017–2020 [notifiée sous le numéro C (2017) 5556]
GHG_DIFF (Target − GHG observed)/GHG observed Calculated
ET_REV Total environmental taxes as Percentage of total revenues from 
taxes and social contributions (including imputed social contribu-
tions)
Eurostat
OTHER_REV  Total receipts from taxes and social contributions (including 
imputed social contributions) after deduction of amounts assessed 
but unlikely to be collected minus environmental tax revenues as 
% of GDP
Eurostat
ET_RATE This indicator is defined as the ratio between energy tax revenues 
and final energy consumption calculated for a calendar year. 
Energy tax revenues are measured in euro 2010 (deflated with 
the gross market produck implicit deflator) and the final energy 
consumption in TOE (tonnes of oil equivalent), therefore the ITR 
on energy is measured in EUR per TOE.
Eurostat
D_ET_RATE Variation of ET_RATE
DEBT Government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP Eurostat
ENERGY_INT Energy intensity of GDP in purchasing power standards (PPS), 
Kilograms of oil equivalent (KGOE) per thousand euro in pur-
chasing power standards (PPS)
Eurostat
G_GDP_PC GDP per capita growth (annual %), aggregates are based on con-
stant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita
World Bank WDI
GDP_PC GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) World Bank WDI
RLE Rule of law World Bank WGI
VA_INDUS Industry, value added (% of GDP) World Bank WDI
GS_EXP Total general government expenditure for general public services as 
a percentage of GDP
Eurostat
SC_EXP Total general government expenditure for social protection as a 
percentage of GDP
Eurostat
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